This study investigates the effect of corporate governance and firm characteristics on the Internet financial reporting (IFR) of the Egyptian listed companies. We develop a disclosure index to measure the three components of the IFR for the Egyptian listed corporations by using an un-weighted checklist. The results find a significant relationship between the three components of IFR (TOTAL, CONTENT and PRESENTATION) and firm size, ownership diffusion, type of business, profitability, audit type, institutional ownership and board size. The results indicate that large non-financial companies that are audited by the big four auditing companies with high diffusion in their ownership and lower presentation of institutions in the ownership structure are more likely to be related to TOTAL and CONTENT. In addition, large profitable companies with high diffusion in their ownership are more likely to be related to TOTAL and PRESENTATION. Finally, companies with a large board size are associated only with PRESENTATION.
Introduction
The disclosure of information has played a critical role in the efficient allocation of scarce resources in the capital markets. Therefore, the lack of disclosed information to stakeholders may hinder their ability to make rational decisions.
Many studies have addressed the importance of information disclosure for stock market investors' decisions through capital market studies conducted in different countries and cross-country surveys of users (Barker, 1998; Bhushan and Lessard, 1992; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007) .
Various methods are used to convey information about a company's affairs to stakeholders among which are hard copy corporate annual reports, press releases and the Internet which has been used widely in recent years.
The Internet is a unique disclosure information tool that disseminates information in many various techniques. Although the majority of Internet financial reporting (IFR) is still voluntary, many companies have begun to disclose information on their websites to attract a large number of the investors who seek more timeliness, and accurate and relevant information which is not provided by traditional disclosure methods (Ashbaugh et Many studies argue the potential effect of using the Internet in disclosing information and the determinants of disseminating this information on the companies' websites. Some of these studies investigate the online financial disclosure in general (Ashbaugh et Moreover, Bollen et al., (2006) investigate the quality of using the Internet for investor relationship activities. Although Spanos and Mylonakis (2006) check the content and presentation of IFR, they do not investigate the determinants of disclosing these components. Further, Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999) use four components to check the IFR, namely: content, timeliness, technology and user support. They investigate the relationship between IFR and size and ownership structure. The most recent study by Kelton and Yang (2008) classifies IFR into three components: content, presentation and corporate governance.
In this study, we examine the relationship between TOTAL, CONTENT and PRESENTATION of IFR and corporate governance characteristics. Our analysis is motivated by recent changes in the world environment in general and the Egyptian environment in particular.
Regarding the changes in the world environment, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requires that companies improve their disclosure quality and their transparency of financial reporting by applying new corporate governance restrictions (Kelton and Yang, 2008 ). This in turn will have an effect on the companies' IFR. Therefore, it can be hypothesised that corporate governance influences IFR. Companies improve their disclosure quality by both the content (supports a broader range of stakeholders in providing more accurate and timely information) and presentation (provides a new dissemination tool which is not provided by traditional paper based disclosure) of the IFR.
In the Egyptian environment, many changes have happened in the last few years. These changes put pressure on Egyptian listed companies to improve their disclosure quality. Among these changes is the establishment of the Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD) in 2003 to spread awareness and to improve good corporate governance practices among Egyptian companies, financial institutions and other stakeholders who deal with these companies. This institute -in collaboration with the European Union and United Nations -has created the Egyptian Code of corporate governance of listed companies and issued its guidelines. According to this, we expect that corporate governance will have an effect on the Egyptian listed companies' IFR.
Egyptian listed companies have some different characteristics from listed companies in advanced markets. Egyptian listed companies are more likely to be state-owned with a mixed ownership structure (totally state-owned, partially state-owned and privately owned). This mixture of ownership structure is due to the privatisation process that the Egyptian government has embraced since 1991 and is still in its agenda until now. As a result of the privatisation process, the proportion of institutional investors has increased. It can be expected that the nature of this ownership structure -especially for the institutional investor -has an impact on IFR. In addition, Egyptian listed companies' board of directors' membership consists of odd number with a minimum of three members. Those members are shareholders or representative of the participating companies except for two members who represent experts. Executives and non-executive members are not governed by any rules. Due to this board of directors' structure, it can be assumed that board of directors' membership has an influence on IFR. Final distinct form listed companies in advanced countries is related to the nature of auditing Egyptian listed companies. Egyptian listed companies are audited by two types of auditing company: public agency which is represented by the Central Auditing Agency (CAA) and is authorised to audit the state-owned companies only by law, and private companies that audit the other types of Egyptian listed companies. Some private companies are agents for international auditing companies. This mixture of auditing companies may have an impact on IFR.
Based on these changes and characteristics, the study examines the IFR of the top 100 Egyptian listed companies at the end of 2006. In addition, it investigates the association between TOTAL, CONTENT and PRESENTATION of IFR and corporate governance and firm characteristics measures.
Our results indicate that firm size and ownership diffusion are positively associated with all the IFR's three components (total, content and presentation). Profitability is positively associated with total and presentation of IFR. In addition, audit size is positively related to total and content, while institutional ownership is negatively related to them. Activity type is significantly related to total and content. Finally, we find that board size is positively related to the presentation of IFR.
Few studies investigate the key determinants of IFR in developed countries. Similarly, many studies investigate the relationship between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance characteristics. However, the impact of corporate governance on IFR still needs further investigation especially on the empirical side.
With regard to the Egyptian context, we are not aware of any previous studies examining the relationship between IFR and corporate governance variables. Therefore, the main contribution of this study is to determine empirically, whether the corporate governance practices which have improved in the last few years in the Egyptian environment have an influence on a company's IFR. It aims to fill the gap in many areas of current literature. First, most prior studies examine the key determinants of IFR in developed countries. This study extends the previous studies by examining these determinants in an emerging market, namely Egypt. There is now increasing awareness that theories applied in the context of developed countries which explain voluntary disclosure may not be suitable in the context of emerging markets (Abdelsalam, 1999; Leventis, 2001) . Consequently, there is a need to examine these theories in one of these emerging markets -Egypt -that is characterised by different political, economic, cultural, institutional, social and other factors, and explain the differences or similarities with the previous results in the developed countries context. Second, many prior studies investigate on the one hand the relationship between company characteristics and IFR and on the other hand the relationship between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance variables. However, in the literature there is a lack of examination of the relationship between IFR and corporate governance. This study extends the prior research by examining empirically the relationship between a company's IFR and corporate governance in Egypt. The Egyptian Exchange (EGX) is one of the emerging markets that has made great improvements in the last few yearsas considered by many international bodies. These improvements attract more investors -especially foreign -to invest in this market to benefit from the economic reform programmes that reflect the enormous growth in the Egyptian economy generally and EGX specifically. This will require accurate and timely information for those investors, and this can be provided by the Internet, as well as greater control from the capital market authority (CMA) to protect their interests. Consequently, there is a need to test whether corporate governance variables have an impact on IFR which will help investors to obtain the financial information they require.
Third, the study addresses the impact of corporate governance variables specific to the listed Egyptian companies that are distinct from listed companies in the advanced markets. These variables include boards of directors identified by Capital Market Law and mixed ownership structure identified by Central Depository Law and the Capital Market Law. Most listed Egyptian companies are state-owned companies. As a result of a privatisation programme undertaken by the Egyptian government, some companies have a mixed ownership. Companies that are totally privatised become privately-owned companies either by institutions or individuals, whereas companies that are partially privatised are state-and privately-owned. The proportion of institutional investors has increased as a result of the continuing privatisation programme and this has a considerable effect on the Egyptian economy. Although liquidity in the Egyptian market is still dominated by retail investors, in 2007 institutional investors witnessed an increasing activity, accounting for 45% of the total value traded, up from 40% in 2006 (EGX, 2007) . From another perspective, 2007 witnessed a rising penetration of new foreign institutions into the Egyptian market with a large amount of investments, whereby total foreigners (Arab and foreigners) ended the year as net buyers, recording a net inflow of LE 8 billion, compared to LE 5. . This study will extend the previous studies to test the impact of institutional investors in the listed Egyptian companies on IFR.
Another distinction from listed companies in the advanced markets is the nature of listed Egyptian companies' boards of directors. Company laws determine the level of board members' disclosure. The board of directors' membership consists of an odd number with a minimum of three members. Until now, no rules have governed the board structure regarding executive or non-executive managers; the board chairman is often also the managing director. All board members are shareholders or representatives of the participating companies. However, only two members apart from this are chosen as experts (Fawzy, 2003) . The names of the board members and their remuneration are disclosed to the annual general assembly, but such information is not published in the annual report. A list of names and nationalities of companies' board members and managers is required by the CMA which must be informed immediately of any changes to this list (ibid). Any conflict of interest should be disclosed by a board member who should avoid voting on any board decision related to those conflicts.
The annual general assembly elects board members for a period of three renewable years and decides their remuneration. Similarly, the board chairman and his deputy are elected by the appointed board members who have the right to change them at any time. The board holds its meetings at the request of its chairperson or two-thirds of its members. Many studies examine the impact of the board of directors on voluntary disclosure (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) . However, we are not aware that there is any study examining the impact of board size on IFR. This study will fill the gap on this issue and examine the impact of listed Egyptian boards of directors on IFR.
In the following section, we briefly present the Egyptian environment and corporate governance system in Egypt. After that, we review relevant literature of IFR and formulate the hypotheses. Then, we follow this with sections on sample data analysis and results, and finally present the conclusions, limitations and recommendations for future research.
The Egyptian environment: A brief overview
Egypt is one of the most populous Arabian, North African and Middle East countries. Many steps have been taken by the Egyptian government to improve the national economy among which is the economic reform and privatisation programme applied in 1991 to increase the role of the private sector in the economic development. The Egyptian government is aware that sustaining such a reform programme relies on the existence of a strong financial regulatory framework, the availability of credible corporate information, and the adoption of internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards (World Bank, 2002) . Consequently, the Egyptian government launched several plans to improve financial reporting and disclosure requirements, as well as accounting and auditing standards and practices (World Bank, 2002) .
CMA is the market regulatory agency that organises and secures the market for investors in EGYPT and is responsible for emphasising market transparency by monitoring compliance with disclosure rules of all listed companies. According to Capital Market Law (CML) 95 of 1992, each listed Egyptian company should provide copies of their annual and semi-annual financial statements to both CMA and the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) (Hassan et al. 2009 ). Recently, CMA forced listed companies to disclose information on a quarterly basis and to disclose any information about a transaction done by an insider and of any extraordinary event that might affect the company's status to improve disclosure and transparency 1 
Corporate governance system in Egypt
Another side of reforms is related to corporate governance practices. Good practices of corporate governance disclosure increase the confidence of investors in the economy of the country, deepen capital markets and increase the ability of countries to mobilise savings and raise investment rates (Dahawy, 2007) . In addition, widely used corporate governance disclosure enables companies to have large number of investors, as corporate governance protects the interest of minority shareholders. As Egypt seeks to attract more foreign investments to its capital market, it is urgent that Egyptian companies apply the principals of corporate governance. Some studies argue that corporate governance has become an important issue in Egypt in recent years due to the integration of the Egyptian economy with the global economy, internationalisation of capital markets and the increasingly important role played by the private sector in the economy (Rawy, 2004; Abdel Shahid, 2001 ). In addition, PCSU (2000) demonstrates that there are four separate but highly related factors that could lead to better corporate governance in Egypt. These factors are: the importance of a strong, clear and well-enforced legal framework, the adequacy of greater information disclosure that leading to greater transparency, the independency of managers and the monitoring of external factors (PCSU, 2000) .
The legal framework that impacts on the concepts of corporate governance in Egypt can be classified into two major groups: laws that govern the incorporation of companies in Egypt and laws that govern the listed companies in EGX (Dahawy, 2007 Egypt has received more attention in terms of evaluating the compliance of Egyptian corporations with international corporate governance principles such as the principles issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Therefore, the World Bank, jointly with the (OECD), completed a survey for the first time in the Middle East in 2001.This survey which assesses the application of corporate governance standards on the Egyptian Capital Market and the Egyptian economy finds that 62% of the principles were applied by the sampled Egyptian companies. The survey was last updated in March 2004 and finds that 82% of the studied companies were applying OECD principles, which reflects the improvement in applying corporate governance principles in Egypt.
Recognising the importance of the role played by corporate governance, the EGX has formed the Exchange's Investor Relations and Corporate Governance Committee, which is made up of representatives from ten EGX-listed companies. These companies are the best with regard to disclosure procedures and act as the blue chip companies to their peers. The Committee plays a communications and advisory role, and also sponsors events and publications (ICC, 2006 Generally, the governance system can be categorised into two main groups: market governance system and blockholder governance system. The market governance system (e.g. USA and UK) is characterised by dispersed equity holding and separation between ownership and control which raise the agency problem that results from a conflict of interest between strong management and weak dispersed shareholders. On the other hand, in the blockholder governance system (e.g. Europe and Japan) there is no separation between management and control and the majority of stocks are held by one, two or a small group of large investors. The agency problem results from the conflict between strong 3 For more details: EGX, listing rules 203 Cairo and Alexandria stock exchange site. Listing rules include the requirement of the corporate governance requirements (Articles 12-19), the requirement of preparation and presentation financial statements (Articles 22-30) and the standard for delisting role (Articles 34-35) which force the listed Egyptian companies to commit to corporate governance requirements. Article (4) forces companies to disclose about: companies' board of directors, business contracts between the company and its directors, management , shareholders and related parties, companies' organisational structure, percentage details of shareholders' composition, all transactions between the company and any of its shareholders, the existence of an audit committee and the internal procedures and regulations undertaken by the company to prevent a director or another insider from purchasing or selling securities of the company based on insider information. majority shareholders and weak minority shareholders (Bratton and McCahery, 2002) In the Egyptian context, the blockholder governance system is dominant. Most of the controlling shareholders are individuals and dominant institutions (Sourial, 2004) . Consequently, controlling shareholders have strong incentives to closely monitor the company and its management which may have a significant impact on the governance of the company as well as the disclosed information.
Currently, some studies discuss the main characteristics of the Egyptian listed companies. Fawzy (2003) 
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Literature review and hypotheses' formulation 4.1 Literature review
Many studies investigate the potential effect of using the Internet for disclosing information on corporate websites. Some of these studies are descriptive, examining the extent of the website and the type of the information disclosed either in one country or across countries. Appendix 1 summarises these studies.
The percentages of companies that have websites in these studies are between 43 and 100; of these companies 33% to 95% disclose financial information. Some of these studies find presentation items. However, all these items are concerned only with the type of format (PDF, HTML and others).
The other type of IFR studies is empirical, which investigates the relationship between the IFR and its determinants. Most of these studies use a checklist to measure the dependent variable which varies from one study to another. Some studies examine only the presence of a website and whether or not the companies disclose financial information on their websites ( It can be seen that most of the studies investigate the relationship between company characteristics and IFR. Few studies focus on the impact of corporate governance on IFR. (Xiao et al., 2004) carried out a survey of the adoption of internet-based financial reporting of the 300 largest Chinese companies in 2001. They develop a disclosure index of 82 items (58 related to the content of either China Securities Regulatory Commission -CSRC -required items or NON-CSRC required items and 24 to presentation format). The study classifies the internet corporate disclosure into five components: total score, content, format, CSRC and NON-CSRC. Therefore, five models are used to examine the relationship between the extent of Internet corporate disclosure and ten explanatory variables. Regarding governance factors, the study reveals that there is a positive effect due to legal person ownership, a negative effect of state shared ownership and no effect of ownership by individual shareholders and composition of the board of directors on Internet corporate disclosure. Ten firm characteristics variables are tested by the multiple regression analysis to investigate their influence on IFR. The study concludes that private sector companies and the importance of online disclosure are the only variables that are significantly associated with both the mandatory and voluntary information disclosure, while size is significantly related to mandatory information disclosure, and both information asymmetry and stock activity are significantly related to voluntary information disclosure.
We can conclude from the above studies that there is a lack of IFR studies in the Egyptian environment. In addition, there is a need for studies that aim to investigate the impact of corporate governance variables on IFR. This study tries to fill the gap in this area.
Hypotheses development
The main objectives of this study are: 1) examine the current situation of IFR in the Egyptian environment, and 2) investigate the relationship between IFR and firm characteristics, ownership structures and corporate governance. Each variable will be discussed below.
Ownership diffusion
Ownership diffusion refers to the dispersion and separation of ownership between managers and equity owners as a group (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) . According to agency theory, companies whose ownership structure tends to be diffused (widely held companies) intensively seek to reduce the conflicts between the shareholders (generally small) and management, which arise as a result of diversity in interests, by disclosing more information which may assist the shareholder in monitoring the behaviour of management. Therefore, the Internet will be a valuable source of disseminating information to the various numbers of investors who diffuse in widely range. This is confirmed by (Marston and Polei, 2004) who mention that widely held companies will tend to disclose more information on their websites to supply shareholders with necessary information.
Many studies test the relationship between ownership diffusion and IFR. Pervan The ownership structure of the listed Egyptian companies consists of five groups; publicly/government owned, privately owned, employee owned, managerial owned and free float. Publicly/government owned structure includes holding companies, public bank and insurance, public mutual funds and other public institutions. Privately owned structure includes private banks and insurance, private mutual funds and other private institutions. Employee owned structure includes employee shareholders' association. Managerial owned structure includes management and founders.
Free float structure includes private or individual investors.
Based on the prior studies, we expect to find a significant relationship between ownership structure and IFR. To test this relationship, we assume that:
H1: There is a positive relationship between ownership diffusion and the IFR.
Institutional ownership
Different shareholders have different interests which may influence decisions relating to the companies and also require different monitoring capabilities. Most of the Egyptian companies' ownership structure contains a representative from institutions. According to the agency theory, the existence of institutions alleviates the conflict between shareholders and management as they tend to encourage companies to disclose more information to reduce information asymmetry. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) argue that information asymmetry will be reduced by increasing the level of public disclosure and this situation is expected by the investment funds.
Regarding the relationship between this variable and disclosure, the results are contradictory. Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) 
Institutions ownership could be sensitive to a company's disclosure for many reasons (Bushee and Noe, 1999) . First, if disclosure reduces the price impact of traders (Healy et al., 1999) , the information asymmetry which arises from agency cost will be minimised between the companies and their institutions; second, if disclosure influences the potential for profitable trading opportunities; and finally, if corporate governance activities are influenced by public disclosure.
In Egypt, the percentage of institutional has ownership increased over the last few years. One of the reasons for this increase is that large privatisation deals were mainly conducted by institutions (Abdel Shahid, 2003). Several major Egyptian private investor groups have acquired substantial equity in a number of privatised companies (PCSU, 2002). The ownership structure of listed Egyptian companies is characterised by mixed ownership which is comprised of government, institutional, employees and individual investors. Due to the acceleration of the privatisation process in the last few years, it can be expected that institutional investors will increase their proportion in listed Egyptian companies. Therefore, we extend previous studies that examine the relationship between institutional investors and voluntary disclosure, to test the impact of institutional investors on IFR for listed Egyptian companies. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and institutional investors. However, this relationship is not significant.
The following hypothesis tests the relationship between institutional ownership and the IFR:
H2: There is a relationship between institutional ownership and the IFR.
Board Size
-At the heart of every governance system is a board (or boards) of corporate directors, charged with directing and overseeing corporate affairs‖ Marek Hessel, (2006) . An effective board of directors is considered to be an effective internal corporate governance device when external devices such as legal environment, enforcement, and market discipline are not developed enough to ensure better governance of corporations.
The number of directors on the company's board may play a critical role in the monitoring of the board and in taking strategic decisions. According to the agency theory, there is a separation between the owners' equities (shareholders) and management which requires more monitoring procedures to regulate this relationship. Proponents of agency theory argue that the market for corporate control disciplines managers, but when there is poor performance that requires restructuring action, internal governance systems intervene before external market forces activate (Singh et On the other hand, some studies illustrate that large boards could cause more conflict between the members of the board which may delay critical decisions. In addition, large boards may weaken the communication and the processing of information (Huther, 1997; Jensen, 1993; John and Senbet, 1998). Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find that the board size of Singapore's listed companies is not associated with voluntary disclosure.
In Egypt, board structure and responsibilities are regulated mainly by the Company Law 159/1981. Further enhancement of board practices within the framework of corporate governance is elaborated in the new Listing and Delisting Rules (Sourial, 2004) . The board of directors' membership structure is dominated by the one-tier structure, and consists of an odd number with a minimum of three members. The Egyptian code of corporate governance emphasises heavily the role of the board and its responsibilities to supervise the achievement of the company's goal which leads to the company's success.
Based on the above arguments, the relationship between the board size and IFR can be tested by the following hypothesis:
H3: There is a positive relationship between board size and the IFR.
Board Independence
Board independence is defined as -the proportion of outside directors to the total number of directors‖ and is also known as board composition (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) . Board composition can be interpreted in terms of agency theory which reveals a conflict of interest between two groups: those who own the money (shareholders) and those who manage this money (management). The board of directors is expected to be the link between the two groups who try to alleviate this conflict. Consequently, the proponents embrace the agency theory which premises that non-executive directors should be on the board in large proportions in order to monitor and control the action of executive directors and safeguard the interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983 ). Forker (1992) confirms that the monitoring of management by non-executive directors makes management more responsive to the shareholders' interests (e.g. maximises the profits) and also more responsive to investors (e.g. provides more disclosed information), and therefore the management will be more in compliance with the disclosure requirements. Further, Gul and Leung (2004) argue that a higher proportion of non-executive directors will reduce the dominance of the chief executive officer (CEO) on the board.
In contrast, opponents of having a non-executive majority on the board argue that non-executive directors do not have sufficient information about the activities of the company and this may restrict critical decisions (Goodstein et al., 1994) , increase the level of monitoring (Baysinger and Butler, 1985) and finally lead to lack of real independence (Demb and Neubauer, 1992) .
The results of this variable are mixed. Xiao et al., (2004) prove that a large proportion of independent directors increases both the IFR format of Chinese companies and the disclosure of information not required by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Based on their findings from 110 London-listed companies, report that director independence is positively associated with comprehensive corporate internet reporting, general content and credibility. Similarly, Kelton and Yang (2008) find that companies with a higher percentage of independent directors are more engaged in IFR.
In contrast to the above results, Eng and Mak (2003) examine the relationship between outside directors and the level of disclosure of Singapore companies. They find that the large proportion of outside directors decreases the level of disclosure. In addition, Gul and Leung (2004) provide evidence that independent directors are negatively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find no relationship between the proportion of independent directors and the extent of voluntary disclosure of Malaysian corporations.
In Egypt, there are no rules that govern the board structure being made up of executive or non-executive managers (Fawzy, 2003) . There should be no more than three executive managers on the board of directors which mean that the majority of the board members are non-executive. In most companies, there is no actual separation between the board of directors and the executive management. It is a one-tier structure of management (ibid).
Recently, the Egyptian corporate governance code stated that the board should include a majority of non-executive directors with highly technical and analytical skills who should fulfil their obligations to the company (Gamal El-Din, 2008).
The following hypothesis tests the relationship between the proportion of independent directors and IFR:
H4: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and IFR.
Role duality
Role duality occurs between the CEO (chief executive officer) and the chairman when one person holds both positions at the same time. Proponents of agency theory advocate the separation of the two roles to support the essential checks and balances over management's performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) . Blackburn (1994) provides additional support for the separation of the two roles. Further, concentrating the power of the chairman and CEO in one person may create a dominant individual which could weaken the board's independence and affect the governance role of the board (Kelton and Yang, 2008) .
On the other hand, proponents of stewardship theory deal with managers as trustworthy people who act in the best interests of the firm and shareholders. Therefore, there is no problem if the two roles are combined as many companies will run effectively with combined roles and have strong boards capable of providing adequate monitoring (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Heracleous, 2001 ). In addition, when the CEO is also the chairman, the effectiveness of performing the governing function increases as a result of the ability of the CEO to control board meetings, select agenda items and select board members (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002 Kelton and Yang, (2008) conclude that role duality is not associated with IFR.
In Egypt, the board chairman is often also the managing director. The board member responsible for administration is sometimes called the managing director or the executive director, and the board decides his/her remuneration (Fawzy, 2003) . The Egyptian corporate governance code states that the board appoints a chairman who is preferably not the chief executive officer at the same time. If not possible, reasons should be clearly stated in the annual report and in this case, the deputy chairman should be a non-executive. According to World Bank (2004, a) most of the board chairmen in Egyptian companies are also the chief executive officers.
The following hypothesis tests the relationship between role duality and IFR:
H5: There is a negative relationship between role duality and IFR.
Competitive pressures
Competitive pressures are related to the threats which companies may encounter from the existence of new competitors into the market. Many studies demonstrate that the degree of competition faced by a company may encourage it to disclose more information (Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Verrecchia, 1983) .
Competitive pressures can be viewed through the signalling theory, as companies are not willing to disclose more information in order to avoid being seen in a bad position when compared with their competitors. Hayes and Lundfiolm (1996) investigate the relationship between the extent of segmental disclosure and past return on equity as a proxy to competitor entrance to the market and find that there is a negative relationship. Moreover, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) examine the relationship between competitive costs (at both company and industry levels) and voluntary disclosure. They find that there is no association between competitive costs and the level of voluntary disclosure. Trabelsi and Labelle (2006) also conclude that there is an insignificant relationship between online disclosure and competitive pressures. The following hypothesis tests the relationship between competitive pressures and IFR:
H6: There is a negative relationship between competitive pressures and IFR.
Type of auditor
The type of auditor refers to the company that audits the financial reports of companies. Nowadays, audit firms are classified into two groups; Big4 audit companies and small (i.e. not Big4). According to signalling theory, the selection of a Big4 company is a signal to the market that the audit process is performed effectively and the disclosed information is reliable. The Big4 audit companies will influence companies to disclose additional information because they have greater skills and experience (Wallace, et al., 1994) and they also want to maintain their reputation in the market (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002 H7: There is a positive relationship between the type of auditor and IFR
Sample and variable measurements
Sample
The study examines the websites of the top 100 Egyptian listed companies in the Egyptian Exchange at the end of 2006. We sort all listed companies at the end of 2006 (595 companies) by market capitalisation and choose the highest 100 market capitalisation companies (see Appendix 2). These 100 companies are investigated to determine which companies have websites. Only 78 companies have websites (i.e. 78%), and of these companies only 50 companies (i.e. 64%) disclose financial information on their websites. As we examine only IFR, we use the 50 companies that disclose financial information on their website to investigate the determinants of IFR.
Measurement of IFR
IFR is measured by calculating a disclosure index derived from a checklist that contains 51 items. We classify these items into two main groups: content and presentation. Many studies indicate that the content and presentation of internet disclosure can increase the disclosure transparency (Hodge et 2001) add some items to determine whether the companies disclose financial information on their website such as; stock price, press release and highlights of financial information. We define Egyptian listed companies as practising IFR if they disclose on their website (1) any part of their annual report (either separately or within the annual report), (2) any information about their stock price (either on the website or linked to the Egyptian Exchange, (3) any information about their dividends or press releases, and (4) any summary or highlights of financial information.
Accordingly, each company's website is examined to determine whether the company discloses financial information. Only 50 companies disclose this information. After that, we re-examine these 50 companies to calculate the total, content and presentation IFR index. Each company scores 1 if the item in the checklist is disclosed and scores 0 otherwise 4 .
The reliability of IFR scale
The disclosure index is a research tool which measures a theoretical concept that cannot be measured directly. Therefore, it should assess whether this index is reliable for the extent of IFR or not. One method to achieve that is by applying Cronbach's coefficient alpha. Cronbach's coefficient alpha assesses the internal consistency of IFR items by determining the degree to which correlation among IFR disclosure items is attenuated due to random error (Kelton and Yang, 2008; Gul and Leung, 2004) . There is, however, no acceptability standard for this reliability measure. Gul and Leung (2004) find that Cronbach's coefficient alpha for their disclosure index is .51, while Botosan (1997) finds it to be .64 for her disclosure index. However, Kelton and Yang (2008) find Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the three categories of the IFR scale (format, content, corporate governance and total) to be .6, .77, .73 and .82 respectively. As a rule of thumb, an alpha of .8 for widely used scales is acceptable to indicate that the correlations are attenuated very little by random measurement error (Carmines and Zeller, 1991) . The study finds that Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the three IFR components (TOTAL, CONTENT and Note: the measurement of explanatory variables
Control Variables
Previous studies identify many variables that have been tested empirically for IFR choices. We control for four variables, namely company size, type of business activity, profitability and leverage. Some In addition, according to the signalling theory, only companies that achieve high profits disclose more information on their website to raise shareholders' confidence and reduce the risk of undervaluation of their shares by the market. Some studies state that profitability is significantly associated with IFR ( To test the relationship between IFR and its determinants, we perform ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Three OLS regression models are run; the first is for TOTAL IFR, the second is for CONTENT IFR and the last is for PRESENTATION IFR. The model constructed for the three OLS regression models is: 
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Data Analysis and results
Descriptive results
By examining the websites of the 50 Egyptian listed companies that disclose financial information on their website, we find that the quality of financial disclosure on the websites of the Egyptian listed companies is reasonably acceptable. Egyptian companies disclose full annual reports. Most of the disclosed annual reports are presented in PDF format (34%) and only 2% are in HTML. This is consistent with the findings of Marston and Polei (2004) who reveal that 44 German companies (88%) disclose annual reports in PDF format while only 11 companies (22%) disclose them in HTML. FASB (2000) mentions that there are two types of format for companies to present their financial information: HTML and PDF. HTML is the common standard language to disclose information on the company's website, while PDF is a file format that needs special software (i.e. Adobe Acrobat Reader) to read and print the required information which is most like a traditional hard copy document. Generally, HTML and PDF are the most popular formats for the purpose of disclosing information on a company's website (FASB, 2000; Allam and Lymer, 2003) . Acrobat files are relatively large, and may take a long time to download which makes some listed Egyptian companies break down their annual report into many financial statements and present them in PDF format to diminish the sizes of the files and thus reduce the time it takes to download (IASC, 1999; Allam and Lymer, 2002) , or in HTML to allow hypertext links to facilitate navigation within the homepage and between sites (Petravick, 1999) . This explains why listed Egyptian companies prefer to disclose some financial statements on their websites (e.g. balance sheet 56% PDF and 38% HTML and income statement 56% PDF and 36% HTML) rather than disclosing full annual reports (34% PDF and 2% HTML).
The three most disclosed content items are the balance sheet (94%), income statement (92%) and previous financial statements (78%). Few companies disclose past dividends (12%). On the other hand, the three common presentation items have clear boundaries between annual reports and other information (80%), printing formats (68%) and graphics images (58%). Few companies use hyperlinks inside the annual report (2%) and webcasting events (2%). Table ( 3) summarises the findings of the items disclosed on the Egyptian listed companies. From table 4 , it can be concluded that of a possible TOTAL score of 51, the highest score is 41 and the lowest is 1. The mean is 20.64, indicating that the extent of IFR disclosure is slightly low according to our IFR measurement items in the checklist. The mean content items (12.28) tend to be disclosed more than the mean presentation items (8.18 ) which indicate that the Egyptian listed companies are concerned more with the type of information disclosed than the format of this information. The differences between the highest total score (41) and the lowest (1) indicate that there is a high variation in the type and format of information disclosed on the sampled companies' websites.
On average, the Egyptian companies' board of directors is made up of 9 members, 76% of whom are independent directors, and 60% of their chairmen are also the CEOs of these companies. Moreover, most of the sampled companies are financial, audited by the Big4, and tend to have ownership concentration. However, only 33% of their shares are held by institutions. The multi-collinearity problem was checked by performing a correlation matrix and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance values. Table 5 and 6 summarise these results. .744 Note: Size = company size, Type = type of business, Prof = profitability, Lev = leverage, Comp= competitive pressures, Audit = audit type, Own = ownership diffusion, Ins-Own= institutional ownership, B Size = board size, B Ind = board independent and Duality = role duality From table 5, we can conclude that there is no serious multi-collinearity between the independent variables. The rule of thumb for checking problems of multicollinearity is when the correlation coefficient is > 0.800, (Gajarati, 2003, p.359 ). In addition, Table 6 indicates that all VIF values are below 10 and Tolerance values are bigger than 0.1 which indicates that there is no multi-collinearity between the Independent variables (Field, 2009 ).
Multivariate analysis results
For the multivariate analysis, we run three regressions models, one for each of the three dependent variables (TOTAL, CONTENT and PRESENTATION) 5 . All three models are significant at p < .0001. The results for the three models are summarised in Wallace and Naser, (1995) , the non-normality variables were transformed into ranks before running the regression model. Our findings support hypothesis H1 for all the three models. Contrary to and Trabelsi and Labelle (2006) , who find no relationship between ownership diffusion and online disclosure, this study finds that the more diffusion in the ownership structure, the more engagement for the Egyptian companies in IFR. This explains the advantages of using the Internet as an additional tool to reach widely-spread owners, which reduces the owners' information costs and in turn supports the shareholders in monitoring the management behaviour (Oyelere et al., 2003) . This result is confirmed by Marston and Polei (2004) , who examine the relationship between ownership diffusion and IFR for two samples in 2000 and 2003. The study demonstrates that ownership diffusion is positively related to IFR (TOTAL, CONTENT and PRESENTATION) only for the sample of 2000. In addition, Oyelere et al. (2003) mention that the spread of ownership is positively associated with IFR. Pirchegger and Waganhofer (1999) investigate the relationship between the online disclosure and free float (as a proxy for ownership diffusion) for two samples: Austrian and German companies. The study demonstrates that free float is only significant for the online disclosure of the Austrian companies.
For hypothesis H2, we expect a significant relationship between institutional ownership and IFR. Our results support this inference as we find that institutional ownership in the Egyptian companies has a negative effect on IFR. One reason for this is the desire of these institutions to disclose less information on the companies' websites to be in a more advantageous position than their competitors. These institutions have already the required information about their companies as they share in the ownership structure of these companies. Our findings are consistent with Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) who find a negative association between institutional ownership and disclosure. In addition, Sriram and Laksmana (2006) demonstrate that companies with more institutional investors disclose fewer items on their websites. Moreover, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a negative relationship between institutional ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure, but this relationship is insignificant.
Our findings support hypothesis H3 that board size has a significant association with IFR. We find that increased members on the board of directors increase the PRESENTATION of the disclosed information on the companies' websites. Many ideas about how to disclose financial information on the website may be discussed when there are a large number of board members. Dallas (2003) argues that a larger board size brings more resources to firms and therefore might improve their performance, which is reflected in the improvement of disclosure level. Our result is consistent with Abdel-Fattah, (2007) who claims that the larger the size of the board, the more likely the voluntary disclosure. Moreover, Gani and Jermias (2006) find that board size is positively related to the performance of the firm which increases the disclosed information. However, no evidence is provided to support the relationship between board size and TOTAL and CONTENT. This is supported by Cheng and Courtenay (2006) who find that board size has an insignificant association with the level of voluntary disclosure.
For hypothesis H7, we find that Egyptian companies that are audited by the Big4 audit companies disclose more financial information on their website. In addition, we find that audit type is positively related to CONTENT of the disclosed information. This is due to the confidence that the Big4 audit companies provide to the users of the financial statements, as well as the pressure that these companies bring to bear on Egyptian companies to disclose more information. This finding is consistent with (Kelton and Yang, 2008) For our control variables, we find that size is associated positively with TOTAL, CONTENT and PRESENTATION. The reason for this is that large Egyptian companies have the motivation and resources for disclosing more information on their websites.
Moreover, large companies are characterised with large outside equity that requires disclosing more information on their websites to hold their existing shareholders and also attract new ones. This result is consistent with most of the previous studies. Kelton In addition, the study finds that non financial companies are more likely to disclose different types of financial information than financial ones. Also, it finds that non-financial companies are more engaged in the TOTAL IFR than financial ones. This is not a surprising result as the content of the disclosed information on Egyptian companies' websites varies on a large scale for the non-financial companies that provide additional financial information for their investors (such as: share price history, dividends, some financial highlights, etc.), while most financial companies provide only financial statements with no supplemental information. This result is consistent with Debreceny and Rahman (2005) , who investigate the relationship between industry class (financial and non-financial) and the frequency of continuous online disclosure in eight developed markets in Asia and Europe. They find that in France, the non-financial sector continuously discloses their information online more than that of financial sectors. Moreover, Bonson and Escobar (2002) conclude that companies in resources and industrial sectors seem to disclose more information than companies in financial and technological sectors. Although Eng and Mak (2003) find that non-financial companies disclose more information on their website than financial companies, the relationship was insignificant. Our results show no relationship between business type and PRESENTATION. This is confirmed by Craven and Marston (1999) and Larran and Giner (2002) who find no effect of industry type in IFR.
Moreover, we find an evidence of a positive relationship between profitability and both TOTAL and PRESENTATION. This is because of the awareness of the profitable Egyptian companies to present themselves to different stakeholders by disclosing more information on their website. Profitable companies tend to show the -good image‖ of their companies to attract more stakeholders to invest in these companies. This result is consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (1999) who find that profitable US companies are more engaged in IFR. In addition, Debreceny and Rahman (2005) conclude that there is a positive relationship between profitability and higher frequencies of continuous online disclosure. Hannifa and Cooke (2002) also find a positive relationship between profitability and the level of voluntary disclosure. However, we find no significant relationship between profitability and CONTENT. This result is consistent with Marston and Polei (2004) who find no association between profitability and CONTENT.
The study also finds no significant relationship between IFR (TOTAL, CONTENT, and PRESENTATION) and board independent (H4), role duality (H5), competitive pressure (H6), and leverage.
6.
Conclusion, limitation and future research
This study extends the previous studies by examining the effect of corporate governance and ownership structure on the IFR of the top 100 Egyptian listed companies. To the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no previous study in the Egyptian environment which investigates the relationship between corporate governance and online disclosure. This study seeks to fill the gap in this area. The descriptive results indicate that Egyptian listed companies should improve their disclosure quality by disseminating full annual reports on their websites. Our OLS regression models indicate that firm size and ownership diffusion are positively associated with the three dependent variables (TOTAL, CONTENT and PRESENTATION). Consistent with previous studies, we find that profitability is positively associated with TOTAL and PRESENTATION, audit type is positively related to TOTAL and CONTENT. However, institutional ownership is negatively associated with TOTAL and CONTENT. Type of business activity is significantly related to TOTAL and CONTENT. Finally, we find that board size positively influences PRESENTATION.
As a result of globalisation, dramatic changes have been happening in the stock market of developing countries. Foreign investors are allowed to invest in the domestic stock market (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000) . Many reasons have hindered investors from investing in emerging markets, among them a lack of corporate governance and transparency (Banz and Clough, 2002; Gibson, 2003; World Bank, 2004) . Consequently, corporate governance rules may affect the usage of IFR which becomes an important request from investors in order to obtain timely financial information, and can improve disclosure transparency by both the content and presentation format of internet disclosure (Kelton and Yang, 2008) . Therefore, it is important for the emerging markets (e.g. Egypt) to be more aware of the importance of corporate governance and timely disclosure provided by IFR to protect investor's interests and satisfy their information needs. The Internet enables Egyptian companies to increase their communication with investors by providing unique presentation tools that are not available in a traditional paper-based disclosure, which increases the frequency of disclosed information (Ashbaugh et al. 1999; FASB, 2000) . In addition, as a result of the voluntarily nature of online disclosure, there will be a flexibility in the content of disclosed information on the Egyptian companies' websites. This makes IFR an important research area in the Egyptian context.
Examining the relationship between IFR and corporate governance is a fundamental research problem the findings of which may provide empirical evidence to many parties. From a company perspective, the importance of disclosing financial information via the Internet for investors may encourage Egyptian companies to determine the key factors which impact on IFR -especially corporate governance. Providing timely and accurate information via companies' websites will attract more investors to invest in these companies which in turn will increase the market value of their stocks and thus lower their cost of capital.
From the policy-makers' perspective, the importance of disclosing timely and accurate information to realise transparency demands great attention in the Egyptian context. One way to achieve this will be by enhancing corporate governance practice and organising its application. Ajinkya et al. (2005) state that -promoting stronger governance could also promote more transparent disclosure‖. If corporate governance characteristics influence IFR, regulatory changes may be required to improve transparency.
From the academic perspective, the findings may explain IFR and its key determinants in one of the developing countries, namely Egypt. Moreover, the findings will clarify the current practice of IFR in the Egyptian environment as well as the application of corporate governance rules. This in turn will make these findings more useful for future researches in the area of emerging markets -especially Middle East countries that have similarities to the Egyptian environment.
In evaluating the results, some limitations should be considered. The sample of the study is slightly small as the study uses only the top 100 active companies in the Egyptian Exchange. Future research may extend this sample. However, the top 100 active companies constitute approximately 75% of the total market capitalisation of the EGX, and 70% and 66% of the trading value and volume respectively (EGX, 2007) . Therefore, the results obtained from this study can be generalised on the rest of the Egyptian companies. Moreover, EGX is correlated with some developed and developing countries. It correlates positively with the Malaysia Stock Exchange (70%), Tokyo Stock Exchange (28%), DAX (47%), FTSE (49%), S&P (47%), Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange (15%) and the Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange (14%) (CMA, July, 2007) . This indicates that these results may have an echo effect in either the developed or developing countries. Meric et al. (2007) studied relationships between the co-movements of four major Middle East stock markets and the US and UK stock markets. They indicate that the correlation coefficient reveals that US and UK investors can obtain the best diversification benefits by investing in the Egyptian stock market. In addition, many studies demonstrate that Arab and Middle East countries have a similar characteristic either in their accounting or in their corporate governance systems (Sourial, The study examines only three variables of corporate governance, namely; board independence, board size and role duality. Future research may examine the effect of the addition of variables such as family and foreign members on the board of directors. Finally, the study mainly concentrates on the disclosure of financial information on the Egyptian companies' websites. Future research may examine the disclosure of other types of information such as social and corporate governance information. 
